D
805
A2
S68
1950

CATALOGED AS AD No. 55998

UNCLASSIFIED

Code 1999

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

SECRET
By authority of:
Director, AU Library
11 Aug 1950 888
Date *Initial*

~~S0010335~~

ADTIC Publication No. G-100
July 1950

~~S0010335~~

IT'S THE LITTLE THINGS

U.S.Army Military History Research Collection

Evasion and Escape during World War II

This document is supplied for use in connection with and for the duration of a specific contract unless circumstances warrant earlier recall. However, as soon as it serves its purpose you will help reduce our reproduction cost by returning it to:

ARMED SERVICES TECHNICAL INFORMATION AGENCY
DOCUMENT SERVICE CENTER
Knott Building, Dayton 2, Ohio

WARNING: This ~~document~~ contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.
DOD DIR 5200.10

Arctic, Desert, Tropic Information Center
Air University
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

LIBRARY
OCT 17 1955
ARMY WAR COLLEGE

[redacted] MAR 1955

55AA 11198

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

CY SD-3-4

RSI Cont No
S10146

U. S. Army Military History Institute

[redacted] UNCLASSIFIED

ADTIC Publication No. G-100

(Project 317.8)

~~50010335~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED BY
AUTHORITY OF DOD DIR. 5200. 1 R
BY RAKERS ON 12 NOV 91

-- IT'S THE LITTLE THINGS --

Escape and Evasion during World War II

by

Oron P. South

WARNING: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

PROPERTY OF US ARMY 50A A 11198

U.S. ARCTIC, DESERT, TROPIC INFORMATION CENTER
Air University
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

[redacted] UNCLASSIFIED

RSI Contl No S10146
ARMY WAR COLLEGE [redacted]
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA.

[redacted]

Unclassified

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 1

Chapter I - BE PREPARED 12

Chapter II - THOSE FIRST FEW HOURS 22

Chapter III - PICKING THEM UP AND PUTTING THEM DOWN.................... 30

Chapter IV - STRATEGY AND TACTICS................ 37

Chapter V - "WISHED I HAD HAD - - -" 48

Chapter VI - MUM'S THE WORD....................... 52

Chapter VII - THERE WILL ALWAYS BE AN UNDERGROUND 72

Chapter VIII - "YOU CAN'T DO THAT TO ME!" 77

Chapter IX - ORIENTALS AND ORIENTATION........... 85

Unclassified

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Unclassified

INTRODUCTION

The material for this study has come primarily from several hundred evasion accounts collected during World War II by the M.I.S. and X. Division of ETO. To supplement these reports odd files in the historical records of the AAF, now in the Air University Library, were consulted. These included Evasion and Escape Bulletins from the Twelfth and Fifteenth Air Forces, Eighth Air Force reports, and a few documents from SHAEF.

From these records there emerges a clear picture of E&E (evasion and escape) activities both from a unit and from an individual viewpoint. More particularly, they give concrete evidence of the tactics used by American flyers to evade capture in Germany and occupied countries. The majority of the cases involve evasion in France and the low countries with a sprinkling from Italy and the Scandinavian countries. Although there were well organized evasion activities in the Balkans, not too much information exists on the particular activities of the individual evaders. Several hundred accounts are available but these are not primarily concerned with the technique of individuals.

[redacted]

Unclassified

[redacted]

As the accounts were read, notes were made of the actions which seemed noteworthy and significant. In some cases the entire account was copied to show a typical experience or to show an unusual experience wherein the evader displayed both ingenuity and great stamina. Of these latter types there are many. If one word could be used to describe all the men who evaded, that word would probably be "resourceful."

In many cases it was not possible to ascribe successful evasion to any one factor or any one incident. Rather, success came from the combination of several different factors. Considerin the overall picture it was the little things that counted -- the little things like making sure that kits were fastened securely, that parachute harness was tight, that parachutes were hidden, etc. As one evader observed, "Of the men who crossed the Pyrenees with me, most had frozen feet. I had no trouble at all, chiefly because I had the luck to get an extra pair of sox. Little things like thi can be tremendously important."

Successful evasion in most cases started at the rear with proper indoctrination in what to do if forced down. If an evader followed the basic rules there was a good likelihood that he would return to fight another day.

Of the accounts read, 318 have been analyzed statistically. This was done to determine if men observed basic principles and to ascertain if patterns emerged. Some actions were incapable of being analyzed statistically, such as the manner of movement, type of shoes worn, type of aircraft, etc. As completed, the analysis consists of cases selected at random from approximately 3,000 accounts. This represents a comparatively small number, but it was felt that there was so much similarity between the stories that the number chosen was adequate.

Any reader should keep constantly in mind, however, that these cases are those of successful evaders. If the accounts of all men who attempted to evade could be analyzed, undoubtedly the picture would be quite different. The things which the men who failed did wrong would constitute valuable knowledge, but unfortunately no records are available from these men. On the other hand, the use of records of men who were successful yields a positive approach and represents techniques that were proven. Because these men were successful it should not be assumed that all Germans were as dumb as some individuals that were contacted by our returnees. That many did not return is silent tribute to those German soldiers who were alert and who did detain Allied airmen.

If the records were complete, it would be extremely interesting to know how many men were injured during the process of bail-out. American prisoners of war in German camps reported that approximately 35% of the men who jumped were injured in one way or another by the time they reached the ground. What constitutes injury is not stated.

If the figure of 35% is anywhere near accurate, it represents quite a large proportion of casualties compared with regular parachute jumps made by airborne troops. At the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, where paratroopers are trained, a study of ten classes revealed the following information:[1]

a. The percentage of men injured on their first jump was .0%.

b. The percentage of men injured on their fifth jump was .125%. The first jump was made without equipment and the fifth jump with equipment.

For the 82nd Airborne Division, jumping with combat loads, out of a total of 91,304 jumps the injury rate was .452%.[2] These figures would seem to indicate that control of injuries results largely from training.

The form which was used for statistical analysis is reproduced on pages 5 and 6. In addition to the form a card was prepare on each evader showing his name, rank, serial number, and position in the aircraft. It was originally planned to include the age, months of service, and home state on each evader. As this information was available on only a few cases, however, this effort had to be abandoned.

---

[1] These figures furnished through courtesy of the Commandant, Infantry School.

[2] These figures furnished through courtesy of the Surgeon, 82nd Airborne Division.

ıfantry School,
.ed, a study of

first jump

Fifth jump was
ıd the fifth

ı combat loads,
452%.[2] These
ics results

ysis is repro-
ırd was prepare
, and position
le the age,
: this informa-
effort had

the Commandant

he Surgeon,

ANALYSIS OF EVADER EXPERIENCES

(Based on 318 Cases in Europe)

Average number of days missing in action: 83
Average age:
Average months' service:

Fighter or Bomber:		
	Bomber	280
	Fighter	30
	Transport	4
	Glider	2
Bailed out: (85 delayed)		
	Into France	216
	Into Germany	12
	Into Belgium	29
	Into Holland	8
	Into Italy	8
	Into Denmark	3
Crashed:		
	Into France	30
	Into Germany	5
	Into Belgium	2
	Into Holland	3
	Into Italy	2
Injured in airplane:		44
Injured on jump:		53
	Type of injury:	
	Leg	13
	Head	12
	Ankle	12
	Face	6
	Back	5
	Knee	3
	Wrist	1
	Foot	1
	Misc cuts	1
	Where incurred:	
	In aircraft	9
	In air	8
	On ground	39
Injured in crash:		4

Disposition of injured men: Evaded.

Action on landing:		
	Picked up by police or troops:	13
	Hid parachute:	175
	Hid in vicinity:	147
	Moved away from area:	107

First movement:

Waited how long: 12 hours (approximately)

Moved in what direction: Toward nearby farmhouse or villag
neutral border, demarcation line, Allied lines, road,
or railroad.

Contact with civilians: 145 on landing
166 alone

Results:

Given food and shelter	277
Given food	57
Refused help	22
Held for underground	276
Turned over to police	1

Method of travel:

On foot	244
On trains	29
Passenger cars	18
Bicycles	25
Boats and rafts	8

Foot travel:

When done:

Day only	96
Night only	42
Day and night	44

Determination of direction:

Maps	19
Compass	47
Map & Compass	80
Sun	3
Stars	2
Railroad and Maps	1
Road signs	1

Railroad travel:

With helpers	5
Without helpers	16

Food while traveling:

From countryside	25
From natives	203
From kits	112

Number going into neutral country: 135
Number coming through lines: 22
Received lectures: 293
Considered lectures valuable: 281
Left aids box in plane: 10
Lost aids box in jump: 30
Had purse: 258
Used purse: 223
Used saw: 7

In interpreting the data on the analysis sheet the reader should keep in mind the following information. MIA (missing in action) includes the total number of days the evader was absent from Allied control. The figures as given do not accurately reflect the number of days spent in enemy or enemy-occupied territory. Part of this time was spent in Switzerland, Sweden, or Spain, but it is not possible to determine on any particular evader how much time he spent in evading, how much in hiding, and how much in neutral hands. It was felt, however, that the figures would have value in indicating how long men would be absent after parachuting into countries where well-organized evasion routes existed.

Under the heading, "Fighter or Bomber," it was not possible to determine the type of fighter aircraft or the type of bomber. In most bombers the size of the crew would indicate a B-17 or B-24, but since this identification was not positive, no attempt was made to catalog anything but general type.

"Injured in airplane" indicates injury received from flak or enemy fighters. Several men were wounded before bailing out. Some of these received additional injuries while leaving the plane, in the air on the way down, or on landing. For purposes of clarification, however, it was thought best to distinguish between injuries received in the plane and those incurred as a result of trying to get out.

Under the heading, "Moved in what direction," it proved impossible to come up with numbers that would have meant anything. To say that fifteen men who landed "somewhere in France" moved southwest would have little meaning. Instead, notations were made as to the general direction of movement which the men made. This item is treated in Chapters II and III.

Under "Contact with civilians" it will be noted that a great many men were in contact upon landing. This meant that the men were surrounded immediately or that natives were standing within fifty or a hundred yards of the landing spot.

For "How approached" an attempt was made to determine if men contacted natives indiscriminately or if they exercised caution and restraint and attempted to follow briefings. It will be noted that the majority of cases indicates that approach was made when people were alone. By alone is meant one individual or a group of not more than three where the group was obviously a family, a trio of herdsme woodchoppers, or men engaged in the same economic pursuit.

Under "Method of travel," "passenger cars" means passenger cars on trains. Travel by automobile, particularly hitch-hiking, wa extremely dangerous and consequently was not recommended. In southe France a few individuals did have success in hitch-hiking by choosin automobiles that had gasogene equipment, but even this procedure was frowned upon. Others traveled with the Maquis and Partisans in trucks and automobiles but generally this travel was not designed for evasion. Most of it represented raids or movement of supplies.

The instructions dealing with when to travel -- night or day varied during the war and by countries. In places where there was a rigidly enforced curfew it might be advisable to travel by day.

To keep from meeting people, however, it was best to travel by night. The figures indicate the extent to which evaders traveled during the day and night hours.

The "Number going into neutral countries" may not be completely accurate. In many cases where a man says, "From there my journey was arranged," it is not possible to tell whether he went through a neutral country or not. In some instances travel in a neutral country may be assumed when a man states that he wished for his GI shoes when crossing the Pyrenees.

The same is true to a certain extent of the cataloging of the number of men who thought their previous lectures on evasion and escape were valuable. At times men merely noted that they had received the lectures but did not comment either way on their value. It might be concluded from the fact that they returned that the lectures were valuable but this assumption has not been made. The figures reflect only those men who definitely stated that the lectures were valuable. Some evaders said that the evasion lectures were inaccurate or even harmful. This observation was made only in a minority of cases, however.

"No aids box" indicates that the airman did not have an aids box when he entered the airplane. In some cases it was not issued to him, and in other instances he did not carry one because his buddy had one in his possession. As will be noted, quite a few flyers either left their aids boxes in the airplane or lost them in descent.

"Had purse" indicates that a purse was in the possession of the man at the time he hit the ground. If the evader gave the contents to a native, this was interpreted as use. As a matter o interest it was decided to note if there was any widespread use of saws. The reports would indicate that the item is not worth including in a kit.

At this point it may not be amiss to make an observation concerning the psychology of our evaders in respect to the provisi of evasion or escape kits. A reading of the recommendations made these men gives the distinct impression that they had little desi to think for themselves or make their own provisions for taking evasion aids. They wanted a kit that was complete in every detai They wanted a kit they could pick up on the way out to the plane. As individuals they would not have to provide anything on their own initiative. They would not have to check anything nor provide anything. To sum it all up, they wanted to be bottle-fed. This attitude is in curious contrast with the initiative and resourcefulness displayed by the same men once they were on the ground. No conclusions can be drawn from such a limited study, but the poi is pertinent and needs study as it relates to both survival and E& training.

The AAF recruiting posters during and before the war emphasized the flying portion of a man's career. Even today when there are perhaps more ground jobs than flying jobs, recruiting posters picture the airman standing on the ground gazing up into the sky.

The story that emerges from evasion accounts is one of ground action. Many men who laughingly referred to the infantrymen as "gravel agitators" could have done with considerable "agitating" as a warming up exercise for evasion. The insignia of two shoes for those who had evaded was not without significance. A man whose chief concern with walking was in getting back and forth to the mess hall usually found that he was out of condition when forced to walk fifteen to twenty miles a day for several successive days. His feet became as tender as "a bridegroom's expectations," and he wished for the leathery callouses of the gravel agitator.

That the men did return when conditions were tough is a tribute to their courage and will to return. Without the will to return, many would never have made the grade.

THE AIR UNIVERSITY　　　　ORON P. SOUTH

I

BE PREPARED

For many men successful evasion began back in the states when they received lectures on what to do if captured and how to evade. Upon arrival in North Africa, Italy, or England, most men received further instructions in these two subjects and their right as prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention of 1929.

Throughout the world the basic instructions for evasion and escape were the same. The following extract is taken from a Twelfth Air Force E&E Bulletin dated 21 July 1944.

> 1. Go on every mission armed with pistol, equipped with G.I. shoes, escape purse, aid box, hidden escape aids, and anything else that is not too cumbersome. Make sure you can not lose them in descent. Remember that "It can happen to you. Do not, however, carry a pistol while wearing civilian clothes.
>
> 2. If bailing out, delay opening the chute as long as possible, thus adding to the time one will have to hide before an enemy patrol appears to search the area.
>
> 3. During descent try to guide your chute away from any buildings, roads, or railways. Enemy patrols must use roads to reach your area.
>
> 4. Remember your jumping instructions to avoid injury on landing.
>
> 5. Immediately upon landing, roll up your chute, put it under your arm and run like hell further away from habitations, roads, and railways.

6. When you have reached temporary cover, hide your parachute well: in bushes, weighted with rocks in a stream or pond, or under the roots of trees. Remember that the Germans frequently send over low-flying aircraft looking for open, abandoned parachutes, as such a thing is sure indication of a successful descent.

7. Having disposed of your chute, remove badges and anything that marks you too obviously as an airman. Then move on as rapidly as possible to a better hiding place. Put as many miles as possible between you and the place at which you descended. Obviously if your aircraft has crashed, you should avoid its vicinity.

8. Having found a hiding place, curl up, have a long rest, and wait for the search to die down. If you feel a bit "done in" take a benzadrine tablet. Do not be in a hurry to move on unless you feel that you are in a dangerous area. If you are in friendly territory it is probable that before long a boy or some one else will come looking for you. If he is in uniform study him carefully as he approaches, particularly his badges. If you believe, but are not sure, that he is a Partisan or a member of a Resistance group have your pistol in your hand when you make your presence known. This should not be necessary for a small boy or a civilian providing he is not armed. If the stranger appears friendly and recognizes you as an Allied airman and indicates that he wants to take you to a better hiding place, go with him. It is at this stage that most of the element of luck enters into evasion. If he is a bona fide helper your worries are largely over. If he is not a helper and guides you to an enemy patrol, think fast and act accordingly -- this part is up to you.

9. It is probable that after hiding you, your helper will appear with civilian clothes or ask you for money to buy them. Put on the civvies but give your gun to your helper. If he does not want it, bury it as it is of no further use to you and its possession while you are in civilian clothes may be a matter of grave danger to you. DO NOT CARRY A PISTOL IF WEARING CIVILIAN CLOTHES.

10. If a helper does not come looking for you, you should make for the hills or other isolated areas. Use your escape map for this purpose. It is intended as a guide only and will not show every minor topographical detail. Avoid roads, villages, and railways and take advantage of all available cover. After a day or two approach a lone shepherd, a lone charcoal burner, or a poor farmer. Make known the fact that you are an Allied airman and ask for help. If you are refused assistance get away from there and try again.

11. If you are in enemy territory travel only at night. If in enemy-occupied territory under proper guidance and dressed in civilian clothes it is probably safe to travel by day. Your helpers will know.

12. When you are in the custody of helpers it is essential that you follow all instructions they give you. Remember that they know the form and you do not. Give chits to helpers, sig with your name, rank, and number only. Show the name of the helper and some indication of what he has done for you and whether you have rewarded him in any way.

13. Never write down and have in your possession any names of helpers. If you are caught and such names are found on you it is an absolute certainty that your helpers will be shot as soon as the enemy can lay hands on them.

To supplement this basic advice airmen were briefed on esca routes in different countries. They were given the names of people to contact for assistance and the names of those who were unfriendl In the latter part of the war the practice of giving names was discontinued because several men talked. This resulted in the death of many people in the underground, and in some cases almost prohibited the recruitment of helpers in critical areas.

In Italy the Twelfth and Fifteenth Air Forces provided "safe area" maps for the use of briefing officers. These maps outlined the areas where airmen could expect aid from the Partisans, Chetniks, or Allied missions. Airmen were instructed to make their way to the area closest to them and wait until contacted.

The carrying of firearms was a debated question. Some men felt or were afraid that they would be shot if caught carrying arms. Such was not the case, however, as long as a flyer remained in uniform. In Italy and the Balkans a person who carried a pistol was usually treated with respect. Therefore, flyers were advised to carry their sidearms until they reached Partisan or Chetnik control. In Poland and Russia, "A Russian General stated that he would definitely advise our crewmen to carry a pistol as there might be hostile civilians or hostile armed bands in areas with which we are concerned. . . ."

For identification all flyers were instructed to carry dog tags. These were to be worn around the neck so that in case clothing was lost or removed during a search, the dog tags would still remain with the individual. Often these tags were the only means of identification that an individual possessed. Unless he had these, many members of the underground in both Italy and France were dubious about giving aid, fearing that the airman was a German in disguise.

Along with the advice and briefing which each airman received, before each flight, he received an escape kit, an escape purse, and escape aids (chiefly compasses). The escape kit contained food (enough for five days), benzadrine, adhesive tape, a sewing kit, and a few other items. The purse contained money -- of various denominations and from different countries -- a hacksaw blade made of fine steel, and a compass. The small compasses issued as aids were supposed to be secreted in the clothes on the airman. These were to be used in case the larger compass in the purse was lost or taken during a search.

To increase mobility after reaching the ground, each airman was advised to take along a pair of G.I. shoes. These wer to be attached to parachute harness or some part of the clothing securely enough so that the opening shock of the parachute would not loosen them. The experiences of many evaders confirmed the findings of the Quartermaster General that the G.I. shoes were almost essential for walking where any distance had to be covered. Out in the Pacific a fighter pilot passed this word along:

> . . . A final word of advice. As long as those damn props are turning, hang on to the last mile you can squeeze out of the old crate, for believe me, brother, your hike back to a jumping-off place will make Lewis and Clark look like a bunch of recruits. I raised the North Carolina flag over more unexplored territory than the entire Louisiana Purchase gave the States. . . .

In the Pacific, and in Europe as well, shoes and any other equipment tied to the parachute were often lost when men fell among trees. The chute caught somewhere in the branches and the men were unable to dislodge it. And if the men were in a hurry to get down and leave the vicinity, any objects attached to the harness had to be left behind.

Oftentimes escape kits and purses were lost when a chute opened or when the flyer was tumbling through the air. To minimize the possibility of such a loss, evaders recommended that kits and purses be fastened to the inside of pockets with safety pins.

For use in countries where the underground operated, airmen were given from three to six photographs to be used on forged

ound, each
es. These were
the clothing
rachute would
onfirmed the
shoes were
to be covered.
along:
ose damn props
ueeze out of
e back to a
like a bunch
ver more un-
chase gave
and any other
men fell among
d the men were
y to get down
arness had to
en a chute
To minimize
at kits and
y pins.
eated, airmen
forged

---

identity cards. These were taken with the subject dressed in civilian clothes, from an angle that most nearly coincided with that used by the photographers in occupied countries. If the French, for example, had their pictures taken showing the right profile, identity pictures had to be taken from as near the same angle as possible.

Crews were instructed to wear as many different neckties as were available so that all clothing would not show up the same. In spite of such precautions, however, the Germans were often able to identify an airman's group merely by the escape photo which he carried.

Many evaders suggested that negatives be carried so that the photographers in the underground could print the picture on paper commonly used in the country in which the flyer came down. Others suggested that photos be taken from various angles and provided to the airman so he would be certain of having one picture which could be used in any country.

Those evaders who had to live in occupied Europe for a considerable period of time, (up to a year) before returning to Allied control advocated that airmen wear good serviceable clothing when taking off on combat missions. Men who had on old underwear, socks, shirts, trousers, etc, found after a few washings and rigorous wear that they were practically without clothing and replacements were difficult to obtain. The men who evaded at night advised against wearing light colored shirts and trousers that would show up in the darkness.

For the use of the underground, crew members were instruct to memorize the names (both surname and given name) of all other crew members in their ship. Thus, if it became necessary to crash or bail out, the underground could check the names of all the men in the vicinity. This helped in finding out if all the crew was accounted for, but more particularly it gave the underground an opportunity to check bogus German agents posing as Allied airmen.

At the time a man left a plane he was supposed to have all his equipment securely fastened to his person and be able to make a exit that would prevent his being injured in or by the airplane. Whether or not he had extra equipment was entirely up to the individual. Many evaders recommended that each airman take a personal kit of his own devising. Some preferred to travel first class as did one navigator. According to the bombardier, "I turned to jump saw the navigator standing by the nose hatch packing a suitcase of civilian clothes!" In his report (both men got back safely) the navigator says he had a musette bag "in which I carried some sweate and a scarf." He walked away from where he had landed, "wearing OD trousers, a battle dress jacket, a tan woolen shirt, and civilian oxfords. After walking a short distance, I took off the jacket."[1]

---

[1] The rest of the navigator's story was as follows. His ankl was sprained in landing so a French family took him in for twelve days while he recuperated. He was given identity papers but the couple had no contact with the underground, so he decided to leave. "They gave me a couple of food tickets and I took a train to Nevers. In instruction about evasion I had learned that lots of patriotic an helpful Frenchmen could be found in Nevers.

There were many suggestions as to what would constitute a suitable kit. If a man had been wounded or burned, he wanted ointment or dressing to help him out. Out of the many suggestions that were offered the following list has been selected as representing those items which were mentioned with the most frequency.

1. Razor and blades. (To be used in countries where men shaved with some regularity.)
2. Tooth brush. (More men missed this than any other single item.)
3. Knife.
4. Waterproof matches.
5. Chewing gum.
6. Soap. (For personal use and barter.)
7. Cigarettes. (For personal use and barter.)
8. Extra socks.
9. Black dye for shoes. (One evader reported that berries could be used to dye shoes.)
10. Aspirin.
11. First aid pouch.
12. Insect (lice) powder.
13. Burn ointment.
14. Additional halazone tablets for men who were gone a long time.
15. Toilet paper.
16. Small packet of dye to use on G.I. clothes.
17. Chapstick.

It was recommended that anything which could be crushed, such as halazone tablets, aspirin, and benzadrine, be placed in crush proof containers. Several men landed hard enough to reduce such items to powder, making it hard to determine proper dosages.

"When I reached the city, I found that it was full of Germans. I was very hungry and tried to find a small restaurant, but I saw only large ones, so I ate at a rather large one. When I noticed the civilian sitting next to me wore a Nazi eagle, I decided not to have much conversation with him."

Eventually, after wandering around Nevers for a while, this evader approached a Czech worker who put him in touch with the underground.

In order to make sure that a man could get out after he h all his equipment ready, it was recommended that he check the esc hatches periodically to insure proper working. The Eighth Air Fo estimated that in 17% of the cases where men tried to jump the esc hatches stuck for one reason or another.

In cases where there was any likelihood of a man's going down in an area where he could pick up such diseases as typhus fev or small pox, it was necessary that all innoculations be kept up t date.

After becoming airborne all equipment necessary for evasio was to be kept close at hand so that it would be available in case of emergency. To facilitate evasion navigators were requested to call out periodically the location of the aircraft. In case of ba out or crash landing the navigator was instructed to give a pinpoi location so that the men would know what to do when they landed. this one small piece of information was extremely vital to the men who parachuted out. Except where there were wounded men who could be parachuted, it was thought advisable to jump rather than crash land, as this would insure the scattering of the crew and lessen th likelihood of capture.

In England the Eighth Air Force enlisted the aid of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions to teach the proper techniques of fitting a parachute and jumping. This instruction was designed to help cut down on the high casualty rate suffered by Air Force men w parachuted (figures were furnished by prisoners of war in Germany).

Where flights were made over water, evaders recommended that all escape aids, pouches, and kits be waterproofed. Some men recommended that a separate harness be provided for evasion aids so that they would not be lost when a man dropped from his chute into the water.

II

THOSE FIRST FEW HOURS

The first few hours were usually the most critical ones for an evador. If he escaped successfully, the ground work for this success was laid early in the game.

Every one was instructed to make a delayed parachute jump, provided the aircraft had sufficient altitude. There were several good reasons for this.

1. The danger of freezing or being frost-bitten was lessened.

2. There was less danger of being shot at both from the air and from the ground.

3. Ground search parties had less time to get to the spot where the evader was expected to land.

Different men used different methods for determining when the proper time came to open their chutes. Some counted. Some pulled the rip cord when they entered the lowest cloud layer they could see. Others waited until trees and buildings on the ground became distinct and then pulled the rip cord. Whatever the method of determination used, successful evaders proved time and time again that a delayed jump paid dividends.

After the chute opened the wise evaders surveyed the scene below and planned their course of action. Many steered their chutes so as to fall in wooded areas or to keep from landing on houses, but more particularly to keep away from roads. Search parties usually traveled by motorcycle or truck so that they had to use roads to get to the scene of descent. The more distance the evader had between himself and a road, therefore, the better his chances for successful evasion.

As soon as he landed he was supposed to scoop up his chute and hide it with his Mae West in some place where it could not be found. Then he was to move quickly away from the spot where he had landed and find a hiding place to hole up. Some men hid within a quarter of a mile of where they had landed; others went several miles before stopping to rest and take stock of the situation.

To find evaders the Germans used low flying search planes and troops. If an evader had forgotten to hide his chute, this was easily spotted from the air and the ground search parties would have a point to start their search. The airplane in such cases usually surveyed the roads in the vicinity to spot men in uniform. The ground search parties placed their men about ten feet apart and moved through fields and woods looking for the evader. In some cases dogs were used to assist the soldiers.

Our airmen succeeded in eluding these searches in a number of different ways. One method used successfully was to hide in trees, since the Germans seldom thought to look upward. Another method was to hide in the middle of a field, as the Germans usually searched the edges and ditches. In the forests the men hid in dense bushes. Several men reported having searchers come within several feet of them without their being seen. During darkness of course the chances of escaping unobserved were much greater.

Frequently airmen were surrounded by Frenchmen, Italians, or other natives as soon as they landed. These people usually hel the evader to hide, and in many cases furnished civilian clothes fo him to slip on to elude the Germans. One flyer who met such a reception committee stood with a group of Frenchmen and pointed out to German soldiers the direction in which he was supposed to have gone.

Where flyers literally landed in the hands of the enemy or were captured soon after landing, quick thinking and courage ena many to escape. Under such circumstances the main emphasis was pla upon escaping early before being placed in the hands of regular pri guards. The following instance demonstrates how quick escape coul sometimes be effectuated.

> I landed in a field, put my chute into some brush, and ran towards another chute which I saw on the ground. Some Frenchmen met me, gave me a coat, and began to lead me away; but two Germa soldiers suddenly appeared, and the Frenchmen scattered. I tried to hide in some bushes but the Germans seized me and led m to a shack a short distance away.
>
> While we stood there apparently waiting for some vehicle to arrive I tripped one of the Germans, hit the other in the face, and while the two were getting unscrambled I dove thro a row of scrubby trees. The Frenchmen who had left me before were standing on the other side of this row of trees. They grabbed me and ran with me until I could hardly stand.

The next example indicates quick thinking and nerve.

> I walked to a dirt road and hid behind a fence, waiting for some one to pass. I got tired of waiting and started down the road. I walked into a German soldier leaning with his bicycle against a tree. For a second we stared at each other and then, because I had an unlighted cigarette in my mouth, I asked him for a light, in English. He looked puzzled, so I pointed to my cigarette. He struck a match and lighted my cigarette and I turned and walked away without looking back. I was wearing my heated suit, green coveralls, electric shoes, and was carrying one flying boot. The German was armed and middle-aged.

Often the evader had to size up the situation while in the air and make his plans accordingly. Witness the following accounts.

> I crash landed on the coast of Holland near the Waalchern Islands after one engine had been hit by flak. I put the P-36 down between a football field where a game was in progress and the dikes. A wing struck one of the dikes and smashed the a/c. Spectators and players were running from the football field when I got out of the plane. At least 500 people were milling about the crash and along the dike.
>
> I ran to the path where the people had left their bicycles and took one , grabbing with it a long red coat to throw over my flying jacket and green trousers. The coat had ten guilders and a watch in the pocket.
>
> I got in among some cyclists on the path at the top of the dike and pedalled toward the German soldiers who were running from a nearby gun post. The soldiers were busy for the first few minutes trying to keep people away from the plane though several climbed on the dikes and searched the countryside with field glasses. I pedalled beside a woman who kept watching me out of the corner of her eye but she never spoke.
>
> When we rode into a small village the woman turned down a side street. I parked the bicycle by a stone bench and sat there trying to think out my next move. A carload of German soldiers drove into the village and stopped in front of the church. They got out, lined up in two ranks, and were sent into the fields with dogs to search. I walked around the town waiting for them to get some distance away before following the route taken by one of the parties. After they had searched a barn I crawled in, thinking it was the safest place to hide at the moment. I was seen by the woman who owned the barn and she hurried out to tell me I could not stay there..... I crawled down a drainage ditch to a field of high grass and hid for the rest of the day. . . .

> During my evasion while I was living in a large Belgian city I watched an American raid on a nearby target. I saw a B-17 catch fire and leave formation. Soon after that several parachutes opened above the city and one floated down into the section of town where I was. I had a good view of it and watched this parachutist land in the walled-in garden of a house. Just as he touched the ground a German motorcyclist stopped in front of the house and ran around to clamber over t garden wall at the back. When the German got into the garden the American burst through the front door of the house and hopped on the German's motor cycle and tore off down the stree blowing his horn as loud as he could and cheered on by the Belgian people.

Generally the hue and cry over an evader lasted about fort eight hours. If he had not been found by this time the Germans gave up organized search. This did not mean that the evader could move around in absolute freedom but it did mean that he could move safely if he moved carefully.

There were many who were taken care of almost as soon as th landed. These men were fortunate in that they landed near some one who either was in the underground or who knew how to contact the underground. The following story is a case in point.

> I jumped out of the hatch door and after falling 100 feet I pulled the ripcord. My parachute did not open but as it was a chest pack, I was able to tear the canvas cover and it opened immediately. I counted fifteen enemy fighters and one chute. Under me many people were running and some of them seemed to be in uniform.
>
> I hit the ground hard without hurting myself, buried my chute and ran to some nearby woods. On the edge of the wood I ran into a man who cried "camarade" at me. We shook hands and I gave him an American cigarette. He took me further in the woods where a man was waiting for me. This man gave me clothes, and from then on my journey was arranged for me.

When a man hit the ground one of four things could happen to him (or a combination of the four). He could (1) be picked up by the police, (2) be picked up by civilians and/or the underground, (3) hide in the vicinity, (4) move away from the area and hide out. The first two have already been discussed.

Of the cases analyzed, 46% of the men hid somewhere within the near vicinity of where they had landed -- up to a quarter of a mile. Thirty-three percent moved away from the area as quickly as possible and covered sometimes as much as ten or fifteen miles, depending upon what time of day they came down, how near cover was, and their condition.

A great many of these men (in all categories) were in a state of shock when they landed or were injured. Of the injured, 44% were hit in the plane, 9% were injured trying to get out of the plane or were hit by some portion of the plane as in the case of fighter pilots, 8% were injured when their chutes opened, and 39% were injured when they hit the ground. In this latter group most of the injuries occurred to landing gear -- feet, ankles, legs, or knees.

Of the injured there were a few who had broken bones which rendered them incapable of evasion at the moment -- broken ankles or legs. These men were cared for by natives until such time as they could walk and make their way unassisted. Men with broken arms or sprained wrists often proceeded on their way with their arms in a sling.

The philosophy back of the advice to remain hidden for the first twenty-four or forty-eight hours was very sound. If a man

hid his chute, covered his trail, and hid, he was given enough ti
to recover from shock, to dress his wounds, and to take stock of the situation. During this period he could distribute his ration
and the contents of his purse throughout his clothing. He could remove all military insignia from his uniform. He could remove a
watches, rings, and other jewelry that might call attention to hi
He could attempt to locate himself. And, above all, he could rest and make plans for the future.

Men were urged to make for high ground, if it could be reached. From a vantage point they could survey the surrounding terrain, observe the movements of military and civilian personnel, pick out the best route for travel.

Some of the favorite hiding places were thickets, gullies, ditches, old canals, hay stacks, barns, and of course houses. The latter was extremely risky, however, as the Germans usually search
houses and often posted a guard in every house in the neighborhood after a parachutist had landed. To attempt to get men to come out of hiding the Germans often employed English-speaking men to call o
"Hello," or "It's all clear now." When searching in groups, the Germans would yell every ten or fifteen feet, hoping to make an evader think he had been seen and to startle him into movement.

Frequently natives would spot the hiding place of an evader, bring him civilian clothes, and advise him to continue in hiding until they came for him. Most evaders usually changed positions after such an encounter and placed themselves in a position to be able to see anyone approaching their former hiding place. Thus, if the native happened to be in league with the police or troops, the evader would be able to remain in concealment and escape if necessary.

For those men who remained near the vicinity of their landing the average time spent before traveling on was about twelve hours. Some stayed for as long as three or four days; others remained only until night and then moved on.

The men who immediately moved away from their landing place headed for neutral territory in most cases. If they landed in Germany they headed either toward Switzerland or Belgium or France. If in France or Belgium, they generally headed for Spain. In Italy they headed for an underground rendezvous point, for France or Switzerland, or for the front lines. In Jugoslavia the best chance was a safe area where one could usually find Partisans or Chetniks. In Greece almost any peasant would care for an evader and put him in touch with the underground. At one time conditions were so pleasant in Greece that men had to be ordered back to their units. Evading had become such a good deal that many men were malingering.

In summary it may be said that the important actions during the first few hours were (1) to make a delayed jump, (2) to hide the parachute and any other equipment to be discarded immediately after landing, (3) move away from the landing site as quickly as possible, and (4) to find cover and remain hidden while resting and making plans for the future.

III

PICKING THEM UP AND PUTTING THEM DOWN

After the first few hours had passed, the evaders started thinking of their future. Many by this time were already in the hands of the underground, others were traveling across country by one means or another, looking for the underground or heading for neutral territory. Most of this latter group eventually found th way into the hands of the underground or into some organized resi movement.

At the time they were passed into the underground or were contacted by natives, many men made one of their first serious mistakes. Instead of retaining all of their evasion aids and mone they made the mistaken assumption that they would no longer need these items. The money was given to helpers and the various aids were distributed as souvenirs. The children came in for the lion' share of the chocolate and malted milk tablets.

In some cases airmen were told to discard their G.I. shoes and G.I. clothing because these would attract attention. Almost without exception the men who followed this advice -- which was contrary to all briefings -- suffered later. To replace the G.I.

shoes the natives furnished either extremely poor leather shoes or wooden shoes. Men who were unaccustomed to walking, and who were unaccustomed to walking in such shoes, usually found that after a few miles their progress was extremely painful. If the Germans were picking up men because of footwear the best thing to do was to dye the shoes black.

If the loss of shoes and evasion aids were coupled with abandonment by guides or loss of underground contact, it is not difficult to understand that the evader might find himself in a precarious position. Such a thing did happen to several evaders. The following story illustrates the point.

> . . . Later in our journey we were waiting in a railway station for our guide, and he never showed up. After we had waited about nine hours, we began to feel pretty uncomfortable. A station workman started talking to me, and I did not understand what he said. I replied, "Oui, oui," and that was evidently exactly the wrong answer, for he then began a near tirade. Finally he walked away, but everyone around the waiting room had been watching us. I expected to be picked up any minute. When evening came, and no one still showed up for us, we decided that we had better head for the country. We thought that we might have to make the rest of our journey on our own. I no longer had any compasses from our escape kits, but fortunately I still had a pencil clip compass which I had been given at my group. Using this compass we started south on our own. We tried at a couple of places to find shelter that night, but we finally had to sleep out.
>
> Our Pyrenees crossing was an especially rough one. Four Europeans with us had to drop out completely. I had some wooden soled shoes, and my feet were pretty sore, but I managed to carry on. It was a rough trail; for a long distance we walked in deep snow. When a man fell down in the snow, we were all so exhausted there was little we could do for him. A couple of men had a bottle of what seemed like pure alcohol; I was awfully thirsty and drank too much of it. It almost knocked me out, and I was pretty sick and miserable. Some sugar was the only thing I had to eat. I was getting more and more thirsty and started

> eating snow; once I started I could not stop. The snow made me very sick afterward. It is certainly a bad idea to eat snow. I took a benzadrine tablet, the last things I had left from my escape kit, and it seemed to give me strength to go o About fifteen minutes from the frontier one man just gave out completely, moaning sadly, "Ca va pas." I kept telling him, "Pas rester ici," but he just lay there paying no attention t me. Later, however, he finally did get across. I heard that was only ten minutes farther to the frontier, and then I knew that somehow I was going to make it, but it was a climb which I would hate to repeat. . . .

As has been mentioned previously, men often had to spend considerable time with their helpers in restricted quarters. In preparation for the final dash some of these men took regular exer cises to keep in condition. One man walked up and down a flight o steps every day to place himself in shape for mountain climbing. Some labored in the fields alongside natives. Men with the Maquis or Partisans joined in raids and shared the precarious existence of the men of the resistance.

The whole point of this discussion is that whatever the means, return to Allied control involved traveling at some time or another. A man might sit in one place for as much as two months be fore moving but eventually (as in the case of the Indian who had ta the castor oil) he had to move.

The methods used varied with the year of the war, German restrictions in particular areas, and individual helpers. In 1942 and 1943 it was often possible to move across France by train. Aft the invasion, rail routes were so demoralized that movement usually had to be by foot or bicycle. In Italy and the Balkans most all of the movement was by foot. In Germany several escapers used rail transportation to move from one place to another. At different times all these different methods had advantages and disadvantages.

In France most of the rail travel was on passenger cars. A few men had considerable luck with railroad workers helping them and "rode the rods" with comparative safety and speed. The men who rode the passenger cars often had helpers with them or had their ticket bought by helpers. Those who traveled entirely on their own usually spent several hours, or as much as a day, observing how the natives bought tickets, how they boarded the trains, and how they got off the trains. After this they practised the routine they would go through when approaching the ticket window and then finally bought their ticket. Even after all these preliminaries some found that they asked for tickets on trains that did not run that particular day.

After boarding the train the evaders sat with the peasants. Many tried to pretend that they were members of families. All were instructed not to talk to anyone, including helpers if any, and to appear to be looking out the window. Some posed as deaf mutes to keep from answering questions. Even those with forged identity cards used this technique to keep from having to talk. Oftentimes when the Gestapo made a particularly close search of a train, helpers would distract the attention of these men long enough to allow the evaders to escape.

In briefings men who rode trains were told to get off at small stations near large towns rather than going into the larger population centers. The remainder of the distance they could co by foot. This precaution was taken to keep from having to go through the checks that were often set up in the larger towns.

In Germany evaders and escapers were cautioned never to ride passenger trains. All train travel was to be via freight ca Many railroad workers were slave laborers from occupied countries would help the evader to get on a car that was going to a border t near France or Switzerland. Traveling in this manner, however, of meant that the evader would be sealed in a boxcar for as long as seven or eight days, usually with a minimum of food and water.

Movement by bicycle was comparatively easy in most cases. Men who traveled this way, however, always took the risk of running into a road block when turning a corner and having to show identity cards. In some cases where men were traveling with helpers the hel could carry the situation. Where the evader was traveling alone without papers he had to try bluff or attempt to turn around and go back without being too noticeable. This of course involved undesir risks.

At different times in France all bicycles were required to be registered. It was necessary, therefore, to have a bicycle with a tag or to have credentials on the person. With but few exceptions men traveling alone had to steal their bicycles. It was an extraordinarily patriotic individual who would give up his only means of transportation to an evader.

The final means of movement left was by foot. Merely to state that walking can become disagreeable does not cover the situation. It is only after reading many accounts that the agony of forced marches with improper footgear impresses itself. To give some of the flavor of evaders' remarks, several accounts are given below.

> Before I jumped, I had taken off my flying boots and put on some brown cadet oxfords. If I were doing any more evading which took us much walking, I would make certain that I was wearing good G.I. shoes. . . .

> I told the old man that I wanted to go to Paris. I do not recall that I had been warned in briefing to keep away from Paris. The old man told me that Paris was some 90 km's away and asked me how I expected to get there. When I replied that I was going to walk, he just laughed and laughed. Later I did not think it was so funny. . . . .

> The hike over the Pyrenees was not easy. While we were waiting at the foothills, we drank a lot of wine. We felt very happy at the time, but we were pretty miserable later when walking in the mountains and sweating all the wine. We walked part of the first night in the rain and then found shelter. The second night we walked in a howling wind and rain. If I had had my way, we would not have started off then at all. After walking most of the night, I was soaked to the skin; we found some shelter for a few hours and almost froze to death. It seemed to me we could not have gone any higher in the mountains. We seemed to be in snow for hours. But we walked on and kept on walking and finally came through in good order. . . .

> We had a rough crossing of the Pyrenees. We had to carry an RAF man part of the way after he almost broke his leg. Sgt Wiggings just about crossed on one leg. He had been wounded in the heel before he was shot down, and his heel was still in pretty bad shape. About all he was going on was sheer determination. My toes were bleeding, and I certainly missed a decent pair of shoes. I think air crews should be told to save as much of their escape equipment as they can for the Pyrenees crossing, especially the benzadrine tablets. . . .

Our guides kept telling us that after the next hill we would be safe in Spain. Then we walked on for days. We got that same story at least twelve times. At one point we slept in a hay lof -- or rather froze in the cold -- having to turn over as a group when one man wanted to shift. Part of the time we went through a terrific blizzard. About half the way we walked in snow up to our waists. Our guides became so tired that two of the party took the lead for part of the way. I had so much pain in the knees that I literally had to lift my legs up with my hands in order to keep on going. After our journey through the Pyrenees we understood why those mountains are the highest in the world. . . .

We traveled with the guide for four days, walking twelve hours and resting four. . . . Each morning the guide gave us a three-inch square of bread covered with bacon fat. He and the refugees ate well, but they would not share their food with us. Toward the end we could hardly drag ourselves, and many packs had to be thrown over the cliffs. Occasionally the guide would offer to help a woman with her pack and would slip off and empty out the money. One evening the guide told us we had reached the border. He pointed to the valley below and said it would lead us to a town. We checked him with our compasses, and pointed out that the valley ran NW. . . . After four or five hours we had still to find a valley south. My feet were so bad that I had been traveling barefoot for the last three hours. We camped in mud at midnight, and, as there was no water available, licked the grass for dew. . . .

IV

STRATEGY AND TACTICS

One of the prime characteristics of a successful evader was resourcefulness. Added to this was the ability to think quickly, to improvise, and to act. Some of the men found that they had undiscovered talents for acting. Most of the time their first performance could have been their last, as their audiences were often quite critical.

The instructions were, if captured, to escape as quickly as possible. To get the captors to relax their vigilance it was best to pretend a leg, ankle, or back injury that would prevent rapid movement. Feigning injury or sickness might enable transfer to a hospital where chances for escape would be more favorable.

One evader placed some crushed aspirin in a cigarette and smoked the concoction to give himself a stomach ache. After smoking the cigarette, he found that he did not have to pretend sickness. He threw up what little he had eaten without any trouble and told his jailors that he had appendicitis. His protestations were so sincere that he was moved to the hospital. Here preparations were made to remove his appendix. Despite all his recanting, the appendix was removed, although it took five men to put the ether mask on him. After ten days convalescence, he managed to escape.

Another evader put on a very credible performance as a deaf mute. He was picked up by the police while trying to board a train. From some friends he had procured a card which proclaimed that he was deaf and dumb. This he displayed to the police but they were suspicious. He was taken to the police station and several methods were employed to make him talk. After these failed, he was taken to a deaf and dumb asylum which happened to be in the vicinity. Here he successfully convinced the authorities that he was indeed both deaf and dumb. After this demonstration the police put him on the train he was trying to get and sent him on his way.

Other men posed as laborers. One evader was being cared for by a French family when a German soldier came to search the house. The evader promptly pushed a ladder up by the side of the house, went up to the top, and pretended to be fixing the roof. The German soldier watched him for a few minutes and then proceeded along his way.

In another instance an evader found that he had wandered into some woods near a German installation and would have to face guards on his way out. As he cast about for some way to keep from drawing suspicion to himself he saw some woodchoppers carrying wood home. He immediately seized a bundle of faggots and joined the procession.

Such acts as these required considerable nerve and an ability to carry an act through. Once the evader was committed to a line of action he had to continue even though he thought that his identity would surely be discovered. One of the most difficult things for any evader to get over was the feeling that every soldier and every policeman was looking for him. He had the constant fear of being hunted or being watched.

One evader was in Paris on his way south via train. There was considerable time between trains so the helper decided to show the evader some of the sights of the town. While they were standing gazing up at the Arc de Triomphe, the evader felt a heavy hand on his shoulder. He turned to find a German soldier holding on to the hand. He was so frightened that he almost blurted out his identity. But before he could say anything the German indicated that he wanted the evader to hold his rifle while the soldier's friend took his picture standing by the Arc.

The following case involved meeting several Germans on guard duty.

> I walked on the roads all that day, stopping only for water. I was beginning to have all kinds of fun and was even getting overconfident. Just about that time the bottom fell out of my confidence. I came around a curve in the road and found myself almost on top of a couple of heavily armed German soldiers who were walking up and down the road. When I saw them, I thought I had had it. It was too late to turn back, so I kept right on going, just waiting for them to stop me and take me off. To my amazement they did not seem to pay any attention to me, so I did not wait around to strike up a conversation. . . . I approached another road at right angles to mine and saw some more German sentries on it. When I came closer, I saw that they were checking passes. My confidence took another jolt then, but I figured I had better brave out these new guards than go back and take a look at the ones I had just passed, so I kept on going. When I came up to them, my confidence started bounding up a bit. Apparently they were checking passes on the cross road but not on the highway.

> As I walked away, a German soldier came after me, I thought, but instead of bothering me, he sped down the road, apparently bound for a pub.

In several cases where the evaders were stopped by guards or sentries the evaders reached for their identification quickly and then let a look of amazement spread over their faces for their apparent forgetfulness. By sign language they conveyed that they had left their papers at home. The trick usually worked.

If the guards could speak the native language the evaders often pretended to be deaf and dumb and unable to understand what the guards wanted. Some indicated that they had been bombed out and had lost everything, including identity cards. Or they indicated by pantomime that the bombing had temporarily injured their ears and that they could not hear.

The usual experience of all evaders was that the ordinary German soldier was comparatively easy to fool. Such was not the case of the Gestapo. If questioned by the latter, the evaders often immediately confessed that they were evaders and produced dog tags to prove their identity.

Strangely enough, acting as a peasant sometimes resulted in the evader's being thrown in jail when the police were making some round-up. In such cases the evader had to risk revealing his identit in order to get out and continue on his way.

In traveling cross-country alone evaders used considerable skill and many displayed a good knowledge of woodcraft, knowingly or unknowingly. One of their first acts was to obliterate their trail. The first step here, which has already been mentioned, was to hide or destroy the parachute. A few men hid their parachutes in one place, moved away thirty or forty yards, hid their Mae West, and then made off in an entirely different direction.

If they were going through the countryside, off roads, they buried ration cans and anything else that might indicate that an evader had stopped or been in that vicinity. In areas where troops were numerous or the civilian population was thought to be hostile, the men carefully reconnoitered all road crossings. They observed cross roads for hours before crossing and then crossed hastily.

Before entering farm yards, they watched the house for several hours to observe the number of people that went in and out. Several men who took no such precautions when they sought admittance or food were often greeted at the door by German soldiers. The larger houses were almost always avoided in occupied countries because they usually contained troops or a German headquarters.

Quite a few men made it a policy never to enter a house that had a telephone line leading to it or a radio aerial extending from it. They selected homes that were some distance from other houses. If after the evader entered, one of the members of a family left within a few minutes and did not return within a short while, the evader left as quickly as possible. After he left he circled the house and left in a different direction from the one in which he had approached.

If a man or a family was approached and did not give help, the cautious evaders left immediately. As soon as they got out of sight of the family, they changed their direction and moved away as quickly as possible. One evader advised taking the name of anyone who looked like he might turn an evader in. The man would then be afraid of reprisal and would not volunteer information.

While traveling on roads and in cities evaders were advised to try to look as much like natives as possible. They were told to walk like the natives, to wave or to stare at soldiers if the natives stared at soldiers. If traveling without maps and using signposts as a guide, evaders warned other evaders not to stop at a sign post and obviously look at the different signs.

The natives of any particular section would be expected to be familiar with all landmarks, roads, and villages in that section. Any evader, therefore, who was obviously looking at everything displayed the fact that he was not a native. If he went through a small village one time, he was advised not to go through again because the natives would certainly be aware that he was a stranger. If they were not suspicious the first time, they certainly would be the second.

There were several different methods which could be used for determining directions. The two most usual ways were by maps and compasses which were in the escape kits and purses. If neither of these were available men could use the stars, the sun, sign posts, or -- in France -- the maps published by the postal authorities. One evader advised that in France the transformers outside the small towns usually carried the name of the towns. Some evaders used railroad tracks which they found to be running in a general direction.

More than one individual claimed that the compass was the most valuable item in an evader's possession. One man used his in a city to be able to tell which way to move in case he became separated from his helper. Another found a unique use for his in crossing the Pyrenees. He claimed that it was so dark he couldn't see the man in front of him. To remedy this, he tied the compass on to the man's back and followed the luminous spot, praying all the while that the man in front didn't walk over the edge of a cliff.

One of the most original evasion stories concerns a Frenchman who escaped from a German prison camp. Like many Americans he tried to appear to be busy and give the impression that he was going about appointed tasks. To do this he "borrowed" a cow and herded it 125 kilometers toward the Swiss border. The cow finally collapsed from exhaustion but by this time the Frenchman was near enough to the Swiss border to make a dash for it. This scheme had the merit of not only furnishing something to do but also furnishing food.

An American evader also used a cow to good advantage in crossing the Pyrenees. He lost his guide and fell in with a group of Spanish cattle rustlers who had just filched some stock from the Germans. The Spaniards gave him a stick and told him to drive the last cow in the column. He did this for a while but finally became so tired that he threw the stick away and grabbed the cow's tail. The cow obligingly pulled him across the mountains to safety.

Men who were down near the combat zone were instructed to sit tight and wait for the lines to move up to them. Most men followed these instructions although a few in Italy got tired of waiting for the lines to move and went through. The latter method had dangers, however, since an evader was liable to be captured by the Germans or shot by the Americans or Allies. In most cases the airmen found a family that would shelter them and remained with the family until the troops overran the dwelling or area. At this time they announced themselves and were taken to the rear.

Some idea of the types of experiences which evaders had can be gained from the type of advice given about travel. The following accounts were taken from the reports of evaders who did a considerable amount of walking.

1

Anything Beats Walking

> I had been told never to travel on highways, but in southeastern France we found little trouble traveling on highways in civilian clothes. We even hitch-hiked, taking pains to signal only cars with gasogene equipment. . . .
>
> Approach people carefully for help once you are safely away from where you came down and out of reach of German searchers. One Canadian went twenty-six days on his own without even asking for food, living on his escape equipment and what he could pick up. . . .
>
> An evader should not try to travel very much until he has learned about French conduct. Once he has been with guides and learned little details of travel his chances of carrying on on his own are excellent. . . .

A bicycle is an excellent means of travel and to get one it is almost necessary to steal one. An evader must either meet an extremely good patriot who will sacrifice his own main means of travel or else steal one. Most bicycles do not have plaques on them. Some people carry bicycle licenses in their pockets. . . .

If it becomes evident that the helpers one happens to be with cannot help him, the best thing to do is to announce a date two weeks or so ahead at which time evader will move on if his helpers have not moved him. Nothing is worse than walking out on helpers who are sheltering evaders. . . .

German patrols are likely to shoot any one near the RR tracks in Maquis territory on the suspicion that he is there to blow up the tracks. . . .

Travel alone. The risk is then much less for the people sheltering a man and the drain on the family food supply is much smaller. . . .

2

Pardon, Monsieur

Use utmost care in crossing roads; find good hiding place and stay there for at least a day. . . .

Evaders should learn enough French so that they could tell Germans they are bombed-out refugees and have lost their identity cards. . . .

Evaders should learn mannerisms of French -- the way they walk, carry their shoulders -- so that they will appear natural to Germans. . . .

Evaders coming down in country sections of France should not wear socks. French do not have them. Never wear rings or wrist watches. . . .

If evader is hidden on farm he should wear wooden shoes. French wear leather shoes only on Sundays and holidays. If leather shoes are worn they should be blackened and made to look as old as possible. . . .

Evaders should stay out of sight as much as possible. . . .

If evaders are seen by Germans, they should act as if they are refugees. It is best to be doing some kind of work when Germans are about and have seen you -- for example, act as if you are fixing a house or roof. Never run away when you have been seen by a German soldier. That will only make him suspicious. . . .

3

Tips for Travelers

Contact old French people; some of the younger persons are not to be trusted. . . .

When near the battle area, the best place for evaders to hide is in the middle of fields. Germans have gun positions and soldiers stationed in hedges and orchards. When search is made for evaders, Germans do not go out into middle of fields to search. . . .

Get away as quickly as possible from area where you landed after bailing out. . . .

If evaders are stopped by German soldiers, they should act as if they are refugees who have lost their identity cards. Learn enough French to explain this without being suspected. .

If evader is staying near battle area in farmhouse, he can count on Germans stopping there to sleep. . . .

If in civilian clothes and seen by a German soldier, act as if you were a normal inhabitant of the area. The average German soldier is not particularly dangerous. If you meet him face to face, merely say "Bon jour" and walk past him. . . .

Be careful when approaching road junctions. Germans post sentinels at these places.. . .

Never flip a cigarette butt away in front of Germans. The French never do this, and it would invite suspicion. . . .

Never be seen by the Germans if you can possibly avoid it.

4

Table Manners

Once I ate in the diner of an express train. I noticed all the Frenchmen watching my useless left hand. None of the Germans seemed to pay any attention, and none of the French caused any trouble. But if an evader has to eat in public, it is well if he affects continental manners, using both hands to go after his food.

V

"WISHED I HAD HAD . . . ."

When evaders were questioned after arriving under Allied control, one type of information desired was comments on escape kits and purses. In most cases this information was included on one form but a number of evaders made some comments about specific items in their evasion narrative. Many of the comments were made without a realization of the difficulties involved in producing what they wanted, particularly maps. Other comments were very sound, and others were purely personal taking nothing into account concerning the overall tastes and viewpoints of other men. In order to simplify presentation, comments are listed, not necessarily in order of times mentioned.

1. Borders of silk escape maps should be printed with phrases of the languages used by people in the countries shown on the map.
2. Benzadrine and water purifier tablets should be placed in a crush proof container.
3. "The maps cover too much territory and hence lack necessa detail. Identifying detail and features are highly important."
4. "There should be maps for every country along the route. Maps are not detailed enough, making it very difficult to find one's exact location."

5. "The maps were not detailed enough as to elevation, direction or roads, and mileage between points."

6. Rubber pouch should have stopper as water spills out when evader is walking or crawling.

7. "Improve the quality of the compasses. The needles are inclined to stick to the glass top, rendering them useless."

8. Horlicks tablets good for trading to natives who liked candy.

9. Caramel bar left bad taste in mouth, was also thirst-provoking.

10. Bills or money should be furnished in small denominations. Large amounts attract attention.

11. Escape kits should be inspected frequently.

12. Rubber water bags can be used to cover feet to prevent freezing.

13. Sugar or dextrose pills should be added to kit.

14. Gold coins should be substituted for American money.

15. "Incorporating a compass that is a compass. Five other men and myself together, and of the six compasses we had, only two were usable. Four of these compasses were out as much as 90° and might just as well not have been there at all."

16. Sulphathiazol chewing gum should be included to relieve sore throat.

17. A separate harness should be provided for escape kit in case of bail-out over water, as it was customary to drop both chute and harness before hitting the water.

18. Carry toilet paper.

19. Escape kits should be waterproofed.

20. Carry insect powder.

21. A chapstick is desirable to relieve wind burns.

22. "The neck of the water bottle should be larger so if one's hands are burned, one can put salt in the water and put them in it."

23. Include tube of ointment for burns.

24. Sew two compasses in flying clothing. You need to know direction in which to walk.

25. Carry extra cigarettes. You can trade American cigarett almost anywhere in the world.

26. Include a razor and blades. In a country where people are clean shaven a bearded man will arouse suspicion.

27. "The aids box was invaluable. I used the compass all the way through France and over the Pyrenees. All evaders should be furnished with phrase cards. They should try to adopt the small habits and customs of the country in which they are evading."

28. "I used the sewing kit, compass, adhesive tape, and the halazone and benzadrine tablets; the last two were especially helpful in the mountains."

29. Addition of tooth brush to aid kit would be helpful.

30. Instructions should be firmly attached to all items in kits.

31. Knife should be added to kit.

32. Disinfectant solvent for water should be added to kit for the washing of wounds and vermin.

33. Phrases explaining medical needs should be placed on language cards.

34. More halazone tablets.

35. Matches in kits should be waterproofed.

36. Plastic water bottle shone in sunlight and attracted too much attention.

37. Chewing gum good as thirst quencher.

38. Adhesive tape used in kits no good.

39. Peanut bar in kit often stale. When good aroused thirst.

40. Include aspirin in kit.

41. Hide empty containers so as not to leave trail.

VI

MUM'S THE WORD

From the amount of information which the Germans derived from American soldiers during the late war, it may be deduced that most of our soldiers were not very security conscious. At various times documents were captured which listed the amount of information and the different types of information which our airmen gave during interrogation at Dulag Luft. For all intents and purposes practically nothing was withheld.

There are probably two good reasons for this state of affairs. The first stems from the fact that the American governmen (and the British) did such a good job of convincing our airmen that the Germans were brutal and would resort to physical torture, that many men talked from fear. Had the Germans been forced to use forc in extracting information, they might have done so. Circumstances proved, however, that Americans were quite willing to divulge military information without any resort to physical punishment other than solitary confinement.

The other reason, which is closely allied to the first, is that on the basis of intelligence available, the authorities did an extremely poor job of telling the soldier **exactly** what he could expect. It did a poor job of telling him the numerous methods the Germans would use to worm information from him. It did a poor job of convincing him that security was needed.

In E&E work the results of loose talking and loose acting were often more quickly apparent than under ordinary conditions. It was often difficult for a soldier two thousand miles behind the front to visualize how anything that he might say could be translated into the loss of life within a matter of hours. Many evaders, however, had a chance to see the Gestapo in action. An illustration of this sort of thing is furnished by the young man who became tired of staying in the room to which he had been assigned. He walked outside and was seen by some one who told. Four people in the house were shot and thirty people from the neighborhood, including women, were sent to concentration camps.

Good security began with the individual crew member at his take-off base prior to operations. During the war intelligence officers instructed men to empty their pockets of all papers except for certain prescribed identification items. The idea behind this precaution was that the enemy might gain valuable information from notes taken at briefings, from letters, or practically anything that a man might carry on his person.

An example of how useful small bits of information might be is available in the records of men we captured. On 30 April 1940, an HE 111 crashed in England at Glacton, the first aircraft of any type to crash with mines on board. When an American interrogat officer reached the scene of the crash he was handed, by the Army guard, a very lovely leather case full of maps, which the guard thought would be of great value. Unfortunately, however, as the maps had no tracks marked on them they were of no use at all, but i the pocket book of the pilot was the counterfoil of a postal order he had sent to his wife, with the mark of the issuing post office.

The name of the post office was Zetel, the day of issue was 30 April 1940, and the time 1530 hours, in other words, within an hour or two of his take-off time. Zetel, it was revealed, was a small town about three miles from Marx, which confirmed intelligence suspicions that the unit was K.G. 26, and that it was from Marx that this mine-laying unit was operating. The information was passed on to the Bomber Command, which paid the town a visit.

In another case a senior and very much married G.A.F. pilot arrived in England with thirty letters from a girl friend. Aside from having considerable literary merit, heavily charged with passion, the letters had other interesting aspects. Evidently the German pilot feared that in case he did not return to base the adjutant or personal effects officer would send the letters home to his wife. At any rate the letters were traded back to the pilot, one by one, for some very desirable information.

The same procedure was followed when a German pilot landed in England and a search revealed a brothel stub in his pocket.

It was determined that the officer was married and the brothel stub was traded back to him for desirable military information.

During the early part of our participation in the war, air crews were given the names of personnel they could contact in case they were forced down. If this information was written down during briefings or later and the individual was captured, the Allies lost another link in their evacuation and intelligence chain.

In many cases the people who assisted in evasion were natives of France, Italy, Germany, Jugoslavia, or whatever particular country the men happened to be flying over. In other instances the men were Americans or Englishmen infiltrated or parachuted into enemy lines for the express purpose of assisting evaders. In order for such an organization to function, it was of the utmost importance that the identity of these individuals be protected at all costs so that the route could remain open for future evaders.

It is not hard to visualize what happened to these men in the underground when the Gestapo got hold of them. In April of 1943, two crew members of a B-24 parachuted near Reims, France. They had been instructed to contact a certain Frenchman who ran a wine shop in Reims. These two men proceeded down the streets of Reims, inquiring of different people where they could find the shop of Monsieur ________. After they finally arrived they found that the monsieur had been taken into custody by the Gestapo because of suspicions aroused after several strangers had openly inquired as to the location of his shop. The wine merchant was never heard from again.

In many cases our airmen were contacted by the French underground immediately upon landing or soon thereafter. They were then taken to the home of some family and in many instances remained with this particular family for some time. Some families were continually afraid as long as an American remained on the premises, while others took great pride in their protege's presence and were often tempted to show him off to the entire village. Such efforts were discouraged by the more discerning evaders. The more people who knew of his whereabouts, the less likelihood he had of successful evasion.

In some cases the airmen showed little respect for the plight of their hosts and invited neighbors in for parties. One or two Frenchmen reported that their homes were practically demolished as a result of such actions; and in one instance near the Spanish border the owner of the house turned the airmen in to the police. He was afraid that with so many people knowing that he had evaders some one would talk and he would be persecuted or killed.

During his sojourn with a family or families the evader often found that members of the family were intensely curious about his entire life and career. Considering that the family was risking its existence in harboring him, the evader often found it difficult to resist answering all questions put to him. In the event, however, that the Gestapo got on his trail, it was to his advantage to have the family know as little as possible about where he had been and where he was going.

Similarly, it was best for the evader to make a concentrated effort to forget the names of all persons whom he had been associated with during evasion. Men were cautioned never to ask for names. Members of an underground organization were intensely suspicious of men who asked for names and more particularly of men who went around asking people if they knew how the underground could be contacted. Very often the Germans dropped bogus evaders in American uniforms for the purpose of ferreting out underground personnel. American airmen were instructed to let the underground come to them, never to ask names, and never to ask to be taken to the underground. In one case the GAF dropped two men in RAF uniforms who inquired about the underground. As a result of the information which they were given fifty deceived helpers were shot and their families deported to Germany.

Normally, members of the underground and ordinary families were very adept at covering the trail of an evader. Often, however, the evader succumbed to temptation and to the entreaties of his new friends and left souvenirs as a memento of his visit. If those were displayed to friends they left a trail that was easy to follow. And, very often the evader later on had reason to wish that he had not been so free in dishing out the contents of his evasion kit as souvenir items.[1]

---

[1] One OSS agent was picked up by the Gestapo after a Gestapo agent noticed a French kid eating an American chocolate bar.

If, upon leaving a safe refuge, the evader was given a ha drawn map to indicate his course of travel, the best procedure was to memorize the map and then destroy it. If he did decide to carry it, he was instructed to make sure that nothing indicated his point of origin. In case of capture it would be relatively easy to trace back on the chart to the neighborhood where the map was drawn. Similarly, men were instructed never to draw on any map the route or routes to be taken.

After being contacted by an organization the evader had to travel to safe territory. This usually involved a lot of walking but often part of the distance was covered on a bicycle, possibly in a car, but more frequently on a train (in France particularly). In any case the evader had to make up his mind either to trust himself implicitly in the hands of the helper or else to leave the organization and proceed along on his own. Occasionally, a helper would go off the beam as the following account illustrates.

> Shortly after this episode I had an rendezvous with my helper at a cafe. When I joined him I was surprised to find him quite high and boasting to seven German soldiers that he had a friend who spoke perfect English. Before I could get away he hailed me. One of the Germans spoke English, and nothing would do, it seemed, but that he must meet me. I tried to excuse myself, but he insisted that they should all come back to the apartment for a drink and a talk, and I had to risk it.

Upon inquiry the Gestapo agent found out the name of the man who had furnished the chocolate. The man was questioned and his story was plausible, but he decided to leave the area because the Gestapo men suspected him.

> He spoke excellent English. I spoke as poorly as possible and threw in all the French I knew. We talked for forty-five minutes and it went over very well. I tried hard to be funny, and told him he was the only Englishman I had ever liked, whereupon he put his arms around me and gave me three packages of cigarettes.
>
> One German spoke good French, however, and grew suspicious of my French. A big argument began between the English-speaking and French-speaking Germans as to my nationality, while I made believe to be very drunk. The suspicious one spotted my Air Corps watch, but I convinced the other that I had beaten an Allied airman up and taken his watch. They approved my action but insisted on having the watch. I held out for a trade and got a German watch in exchange. Before the argument ended, the suspicious German demanded my identification card. I had one, but it stated that I was deaf and dumb. This information was on the last line, so I kept my thumb over it, and was drunkenly quarrelsome when one tried to take the card from my hand. The card convinced the English-speaking German, and the whole scene so sobered my friend that he quickly got the lot out of the apartment.

Cases of this type were extremely rare. On the other hand there were many Americans who did foolish things. Consider the case of the pilot who was downed in Italy. He was picked up by an Italian family and placed in hiding. Due to an injury he was unable to move by himself and had to remain in hiding for some time. Tiring of his enforced inactivity and inability to return to Allied lines, he sent an Italian through the German lines to the Americans. In order, he thought, to make sure that the Americans would come look for him he gave the Italian a diary which he had been keeping. This diary gave the names of all individuals who had helped him, including the local doctor. Had this information fallen into German hands, undoubtedly all of the people mentioned would have been liquidated. After his return to American control the officer was recommended for courts martial action because of a breach of security.[1]

In traveling by train the evader was often accompanied by one or more helpers. In the event that police or Gestapo agents searched the train, it was imperative that the evader did not reveal in any way that he was traveling with anyone.

Likewise, if an evader was walking down a street and was accosted by the police, he was instructed to insist that he was alone.

In many instances the Germans set up bogus underground channels in order to turn up regular underground organizations and to extract military information from evaders. These were usually recognized by the openness with which they traveled, the ease with which they bought off police, good food, and a desire for informatio At Lisbon the Germans kept an Irishman on duty at all times in one of the local pubs to pry information out of evaders. He had plenty of money, posed as an evader, and attempted to find out the routes used by evaders coming into Spain.

Men who evaded one of the occupied countries and entered a neutral country such as Spain, Switzerland, or Sweden were cautioned to talk to no one about their experiences except the American military attache. They could contact any American official for help, but in Spain particularly it was best not to make themselves known until in the hands of our own authorities. Many Spanish police and diplomatic officials were in the employment of the German government and tried to find out from evaders the routes and personnel they had used in coming across the border. The same was true of all neutral countries in which our men went.

---

[1] Ironically enough, the officer stated after his breach of security, "I would have sent my dog tags with this man but you know the rules."

Airmen who were forced to land in Soviet territory were instructed to signal their peaceful intentions before landing. After this was done they could land and request return to American control. If the Russians asked for military information, our men were to indicate that they were not allowed to answer. In the cases where they were questioned our men reported no difficulty with the Russians when they refused to answer. The Russians respected men who did not talk.

Talking When Captured

It must be remembered that in the late war both sides abided fairly closely to the rules of the Geneva Convention so far as the treatment of enemy prisoners of war was concerned, particularly Air Force prisoners of war. With but few exceptions forcible measures were not resorted to in the questioning of prisoners. In reality there was no necessity for this since most of the men talked freely. To encourage talking the Germans and the Allies employed a number of tactics ranging from bribery to threats.

Generally, an airman was subjected to two interrogations. The first one came as soon as he was picked up and was merely a preliminary questioning for information of immediate value. If the airman could be picked up immediately after he landed, the chances of his talking were very good. Knowingly or unknowingly most airmen were in a state of shock or nervous reaction when they landed. At this time they were particularly vulnerable to questioning by a skilled interrogator because they were not mentally prepared for what had happened to them. The prisoner had likely heard atrocity stories about the enemy and was fearful of what might happen to him. The interrogator naturally played upon such fears in inducing the individual to talk.

If physical punishment other than confinement was administered it usually came at this level of interrogation. Men who were picked up by units in the field, particularly those units that had just suffered a bombing or strafing attack, were often treated with less than loving care.

At the Dulag Luft, however, prisoners were treated with much more finesse. No authenticated cases have been recorded of prisoners being subjected to violence (at least so far as American prisoners of war were concerned). Here the prisoner might be subjected to solitary confinement or he might get the lavish treatment which included wining and dining. Interrogation was conducted by skilled men who usually succeeded in obtaining the information they desired, often without the knowledge of the prisoner.

Men who appeared scared were given the threat treatment. An example of this follows:

> Three men were marched into a room where there were half a dozen super tough Gestapo Storm Troopers and at a desk was an evil looking bully. He said in very harsh tones, "You have information that the Reich must have. It is unfortunate, but the Gestapo can and will stop at nothing to get the answers to my questions." He would then ask several questions in regard to the performance of aircraft, the composition of units, and say to the first man, "I give you one minute to answer the question. If you do not answer it, the firing squad has orders to take you out and shoot you." There was then a tense minute of silence. The first airman, having not answered, was then led away, and a volley rang out. The guards returned and made their report. The agent sitting at the desk then said in a metallic voice, "Gentlemen, one of your comrades has paid the price of his folly. We will now give the second man a chance to make up his mind." The same drama was then reinacted. The interrogator then turned to the last man and said, "Lieutenant, your two comrades have paid for their obstinate stupidity with their lives. I hope you will observe that there is no American here to be a witness to the fact that you have given us military information."

Unless the third man had an extraordinary amount of intestinal fortitude, he was likely to give the information.

The usual trick which the interrogators played on prisoners was to get them to talking about anything. Officers fell for this more than enlisted men because many felt that their intellect was superior to that of the interrogator and that they could distinguish between military and non-military information. By assuming this, the officers played directly into the hands of the interrogators and once they had started talking the interrogators got everything they wanted. How small pieces of information which appear harmless may be used to advantage is illustrated by the following story:

> Another prisoner, who was rather more security minded told us that his Squadron Commander (whose name he refused to give us) was in a spot of trouble, all on account of the

> beautiful wife of the local landowner. The landowner went off for a fortnight and the Squadron Commander seized the opportunity and took Frau Schmidt out for a party one night. He took service transport without leave, and a very good time was had by all until about four a.m. Unfortunately for him, on the way home he succeeded in wrapping the car and Frau Schmidt around a tree, with the result that not only was he going to face a court martial for using service transport, but he also had Herr Schmidt to deal with. Well, that was duly recorded, and a few weeks later an aircraft was shot down with an officer who we had reason to suspect was the C.O. of this unit. When he was interrogated the first question he was asked was whether he had had that awkward interview with Mr. Schmidt. His face gave away the fact that he was indeed the C.O.

With his composure broken this officer was then ready to be softened for questions that he could answer.

At one time during the war the Germans were very anxious to know why our fighter pilots were using white tracers mixed with ordinary tracers. An officer was captured who the Germans thought had the answer to the question. This officer was treated nicely, given good food, cigarettes, pleasant quarters, and allowed to walk over the prison camp with his interrogator. The interrogator made no attempt to inject military matters into the conversation until two or three days had gone by and the officer was thrown off his guard. Meanwhile, other Dulag Luft personnel had identified the group from which the American officer had come by the photograph which the officer carried for escape purposes.

Armed with this information, plus detailed information about members of the group and physical facilities at the group, the interrogator was ready to find out what he wanted to know. He introduced the information into the conversation and astounded his prisoner with the correctness and minute detail of his knowledge. Then he casually stated, "It's too bad you Americans are running out of tracers and have to use white bullets."

"Oh we're not out," boasted the American, proud of the production machine behind him. "We merely use those to let the other pilots know which plane we intend to attack." After talking with the prisoner for a short while longer the interrogator dismissed him and the prisoner still felt that he had not divulged any military information.

Probably the most useful device of any for making a prisoner talk was the solitary cell. Most aircrew members were young men accustomed to leading an active life. The forced inactivity of solitary confinement soon palled on them and they were quite willing to exchange information for freedom. The attitude of the confined prisoner has never been better expressed than by that master of English prose Winston Churchill.[1]

> Prisoner of war! That is the least unfortunate kind of prisoner to be, but it is nevertheless a melancholy state. You are in the power of your enemy. You owe your life to his humanity, and your daily bread to his compassion. You must obey his orders, go where he tells you, stay where you are bid, await his pleasure, possess your soul in patience. Meanwhile the war is going on, great events are in progress, fine opportunities for action and adventure are slipping away. Also the days are very long. Hours crawl like paralytic centipedes. Nothing amuses you. Reading is difficult, writing impossible. Life is one long boredom from dawn till slumber.
>
> Moreover, the whole atmosphere of prison, even the most

---

[1] Churchill, Winston S., A Roving Commission, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942. While a newspaper reporter, Mr. Churchill was captured by the Boers during the Boer War.

> easy and best regulated prison, is odious. . . . If you have never been under restraint before and never known what it was to be a captive, you feel a sense of constant humiliation in being confined to a narrow space, fenced in by railings and wire, watched by armed men, and webbed about with a tangle of regulations and restrictions.
>
> Dark moods come easily across the mind of a prisoner. Of course if he is kept on very low diet, chained in a dungeon, deprived of light and plunged into solitude, his moods only matter to himself. . . .

The number of ruses and techniques used by skilled interrogators to make a prisoner talk was limited only by their imagination. By 1944 the Germans had had enough experience to become extremely versed in the art and as the war went increasingly against them they redoubled their efforts to obtain information from prisoners.

That their efforts were successful was attested by documents captured showing the information obtained from prisoners. During the summer of 1944 the Allies picked up a Dulag Luft document that listed the results of interrogation of 112 aircraft crews -- 89 USAAF 21 RAF, and 2 RCAF. Examples of the kind of information derived from these crews follow:

1. A PW of _______ Squadron told his interrogator that the Liberator A-F was to be withdrawn from the USAAF. The chief new type was the J, about which no pilots were enthusiastic. It was difficult to land because of trimming difficulties; the new nose turret was much heavier than in the old types, etc.

2. A very experienced and talkative Canadian pilot of a USAAF Squadron was full of praise for the P-51, so much so that Dulag Luft was able to produce three and one-half pages of detail intelligence on the subject of this aircraft alone. The Germans at this time were particularly anxious to know the maximum range of the Mustang. This pilot had recently, as it happened, tested fully the range of this aircraft. He told his interrogator

the time, height, boost used and speed of this aircraft at all stages during his long range flight. He also described the fighter tactics of the Mustang on escort and compared its flying characteristics with the Spitfire.

3. In March of 1944 a crew of a Fortress Squadron revealed all the secrets of 'Stinky' and "Micky,' and various officers of ______ Group shot down in April 1944 compared for the Germans the merits of the H2S and Meddo systems. It also emerged that efforts were being made to provide each Bomber Group with its own P.F. Squadron. A consolidated report of the same month went into more detail about Meddo, the 'Remote' and 'Near Scope," the 'Snoop Camera," so that the Germans were in no doubt as to how they were employed.

4. A PW of a Fortress Squadron stated that the form of attack most feared was from in front from 1200 feet higher, because only the top turret could then come into action.

An analysis of the most common methods used to make a prisoner talk is given below.[1]

1. Stimulate natural desire of people to talk. Most people have a natural tendency for talking and answering questions. "The prisoner of war is no different and the reasons for this may be listed as follows:

   a. Interest in oneself.
   b. Liking of other's interest in oneself.
   c. A desire to impress others by what one knows.
   d. A desire to please.
   e. Semi-reflex habit of talking.

2. Questioning a prisoner about himself, what he has suffered and what his immediate needs are.

3. Most prisoners are unfamiliar with the Geneva Convention and their rights under the rules of warfare and through fear of what may happen to them will talk when threats, either oral or implied, are made.

---

[1] This summary was taken from "Air Technical Intelligence Interrogation Manual," prepared by Air Technical Intelligence Operations Section, Collection Services Division, Intelligence Department, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio. Verbatim parts are indicated by quotation marks.

4. Attempt to make the prisoner relax by the interrogator showing a personal interest in him.

5. Reprimand for lack of military courtesy. The interrogator notices some real or fancied violation of military courtesy and by reprimand hopes to induce the prisoner to talk and defend himself against the charge.

6. "The interrogator introduces doubts in the prisoner's mind regarding the cause his country is fighting for, the alli of his country, and the political parties within his country.

"A good example of this technique was used during World War II whereby the English prisoner was treated to a colorful picture of the relationship between American troops and **English** women. American prisoners, in turn, were shown world maps splashed with the red of the British Empire and were told that they were fighting not for their country but to preserve England."

7. "When the prisoner is caught in the act of lying and this is brought to his attention, he usually acts like a schoolboy who was caught breaking rules, and will reveal all he knows. If the prisoner lies, he lies in a clumsy manner which can readily be detected. Secondly, those lies are based on an ignorance of the system of interrogation and the amount of information already known to the interrogator. At the moment he is caught lying, the prisoner becomes so insecure and pliable that he tells much more than he would have if he had not attempted to tell a lie."

8. "The interrogator convinces the prisoner that he cannot reveal or betray anything as everything is already known and that the questions only serve to satisfy the curiosity of the 'higher-ups.' The interrogator stresses that he is a victim of red tape that prevails on both sides."

9. The interrogator attempts to bait the prisoner into talking by telling him he really knows nothing and that is the reason for not talking. When the prisoner attempts to defend himself he falls into the hands of the interrogator.

10. Sympathy towards a prisoner's wounds, his wife and children and family at home, a sympathetic understanding for his plight, a show of indignation at his plight, anything to make the prisoner feel that the interrogator is his friend.

11. Interrogator stands behind dazzling light and questions prisoner. This may continue for some time with the prisoner being questioned by relays of interrogators.

12. The prisoner is told that name, rank, and serial number are not sufficient identification, that there are spies and saboteurs loose and that unless he can establish positive identification he will be classed as a spy.

13. Interrogator will reveal confidential or secret information about his own country in order to get the same type of information from the prisoner.

14. Bribery. This may take the form of promises -- to keep crew members together, to get better treatment for prisoner, better food, or any number of things. Or, it may take the form of cigarettes, more liberties, superior treatment, etc.

15. The prisoner is informed that he really isn't revealing anything new since his own comrades have already talked. The interrogator then reveals information allegedly received from the prisoner's comrades and urges the prisoner to talk.

16. Prisoner is told that after capture the security regulations of his country no longer apply, that the war is over for him, and that he is no longer obligated to keep quiet about what he knows.

17. Prisoner is treated with extreme kindness. He is given excellent food and drink, probably will dine with the interrogator, and an attempt will be made to make him talk while under the influence of good treatment.

18. Prisoner is accused of violating the international rules of warfare by bombing non-military targets. Unless he can furnish positive proof that he did not participate in such action he will be tried for war crimes.

19. Threaten to turn prisoner over to underground or native populace that has been bombed.

20. Threaten to notify the prisoner's country that he is a traitor.

21. "Bring pressure to bear by telling prisoner that the life of one of his comrades depends on what information the prisoner will offer to properly identify his comrades."

22. Solitary confinement.

It may readily be deduced from reading this summary that the main efforts of the interrogators were directed toward getting the prisoner to talk about anything. They did not expect him to start spouting military information like an automaton but knew that once he started talking, even about the most trivial affairs, the rest was just a matter of course.

The antidote to all this was to give only name, rank, and serial number. Most skilled interrogators agreed that this was the only way a soldier could keep from disclosing military information. If he stuck to the routine name, rank, and serial number, or something similar, the interrogator found him hard to crack. To be successful in this the prisoner had to be correct at all times in his attitude toward his captors. If he failed to salute and offer other military courtesies he laid himself liable to disciplinary punishment which would weaken his power to resist.

If the prisoner disclosed information about E&E activities, he jeopardized not only the men who might come after him but the lives of those people actively engaged in underground work. In some areas if one individual was compromised the Allies had difficulty in evacuating evaders through that area. In strategic spots such as the Brenner Pass it was obvious that only a limited number of people could be used and that if these were killed and the other natives were scared, the task of assisting evaders through became an impossibility.

Likewise if the prisoner disclosed military information the war was likely to be prolonged. One intelligence officer has estimated that the war in Europe was prolonged six months by virtue of the information which our prisoners gave to the Germans.

VII

THERE WILL ALWAYS BE AN UNDERGROUND

As the Germans moved into the different countries of Europe, either as conquerors or as brothers, resistance on the part of the native populations appeared. With no outside or inside agencies to direct the activities of individuals who felt like resisting, resistance took many forms. An old man, scarcely knowing what he was doing, picked up a rifle from a fallen soldier and fired at a German. Another cautiously dropped sand into the gas tank of a German vehicle. Another assisted a wounded soldier to escape from his pursuers. These uncoordinated actions represented a great formless movement that was in evidence all over occupied Europe. Like a newly born child its efforts were mere gropings aimed in no particular direction.

To evaders and escapers this movement had a great significance. It meant that from the time a country was occupied, from the first day the attack began, they could expect help from the native population. All of the natives of course would not render aid. Some would be afraid, some would not be sympathetic, and some would not have the means at their disposal to be of any help. But, there were some who were not only willing, they were able.

It is a common axiom in this country that "Politics makes strange bedfellows." The German attempt to extend Nazi control over all Europe made even stranger bedfellows on the Continent. In general resistance was prompted by two motivations, political and religious (aside from being anti-German).

The largest political force throughout Europe was Communism. Although the Comintern was supposedly dissolved, activities which had previously been attributed to this organization could be detected in every country. In Yugoslavia and Albania, and other countries in the Balkans, the Communists emerged as Partisans. In France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, Austria, and Luxembourg, the Communists joined the Underground and fought alongside Catholics, Jews, and others. Many of the Communists were nationalistic in their outlook, while some looked to Moscow for guidance.

In addition to the unifying influence of Communism there were other political forces at work. Every country had its opposition party. Aside from the one common aim of driving the Germans out, these parties often had little in common. In France, for example, it has been estimated that there were at least fifty different political factions representing that many different views.

In the Balkans the situation was almost as complicated. Some were pro-German and anti-Russian. Some were pro-Russian and anti-English. Some were pro-English and anti-Partisan. Affairs in the Balkans were complicated by the many different nationalities, most of whom had political aspirations which led to independence. It had never been difficult to stir these people into becoming anti-administration.

Catholicism, like Communism, exercised a unifying influence all over Europe. With but few exceptions evaders, escapers, members of the underground, and others in disfavor with the administration could count on receiving aid from Catholic priests and churches. It was somewhat strange to see Communists and Catholics working side by side for a common cause, but nevertheless it was a common sight.

During the early days of occupation underground movements were greatly disorganized and often different groups worked at cross purposes. Inasmuch as the various governments had made no provisions for underground work, there was no central or even local head responsible for coordinating all activities in certain regions.

This made for confusion of effort and often resulted in unnecessary loss of life. As a consequence the more clear-headed and forward-thinking members of the underground made early efforts to set up an organization that resembled a military command. This movement was assisted by the government-in-exile of that country.

Free from restrictions upon movement and gathering the government-in-exile could assess the needed effort at different places and send agents to those areas to organize the efforts of all underground forces. As more intelligence trickled back to the government-in-exile it could formulate better plans and take steps to damage the Germans in more vital spots.

Partisan activities were quite different from underground activities. In the first place the guerrilla type of warfare engaged in by the Partisans was dependent upon either wooded or mountainous terrain, preferably both. In comparative isolation the Partisans could gather unmolested and swoop down upon some unsuspecting German supply train or German garrison. In the cities and on the plains it was difficult to gather sufficient men without attracting the attention of the Germans.

There was also a more fundamental difference between the Partisans and the Underground. The Partisans were actively opposing the Germans with troops. Theirs was a type of warfare in which troops often met troops and pitched battle resulted. Their aim was to drive the Germans out of the country. In Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito and his Partisans kept as many as seven or eight German divisions occupied.

In the Underground, efforts were made to cripple the entire German war effort, not only in that particular country but in other countries as well. In Czechoslovakia, for example, workers in the Skoda munitions factories furnished the Germans with many shells that turned out to be duds. This did not have any immediate effect in Czechoslovakia, except to have several people shot for disturbing the war effort, but on the Russian front several German divisions were captured because their duds could not hold back Russian advances.

The Underground depended upon stealth and silence to accomplish its work. So did the Partisans, for that matter, but the difference between overt and covert action was still there.

The members of both the Underground and the Partisans were willing and able to assist Allied fliers to return to England. Both groups had need at times to send their own personnel out of the country or out of occupied Europe and in those instances evaders could utilize the same routes.

Much of the work done in passing evaders back into Allied control was unorganized during 1940 and 1941. The English apparently did not expect to get many men back and consequently gave only meager instructions as to what to do if forced down. The same was true of the Americans when we entered the fracas. It was not until 1942-43 the strenuous efforts were made to get these men back.

In summary it may be said that Partisan and Underground activity was directed along four lines. These were (1) military operations in which Partisan troops engaged enemy troops, (2) sabotage and seizure of enemy material, (3) production of military intelligence for the Allies and themselves, (4) the creation of civil disorder or passive resistance by organizing strikes or labor slowdowns.

VIII

"YOU CAN'T DO THAT TO ME!"

The rules and regulations concerning the rights and privileges of prisoners of war under international law have been subject to variations from time to time as wars progress. During World War II, the practices of the prominent neutrals, Switzerland, Sweden, and Spain, changed throughout the course of the war. The treatment of evaders and escapers by neutrals was probably more subject to change than the treatment of prisoners of war by the enemy.

Any member of our armed forces who entered a neutral country during the war was allowed to remain at liberty if he was an escaper. It thus behooved any soldier, whether or not he was actually an escaper, to contend that he had escaped from enemy or enemy-occupied territory. In order to convince the authorities, it was necessary to make up some story and stick to it. Men who crossed the border into neutral territory and disclosed that they were evaders who had never been in the custody of the enemy were generally interned.

In crossing any border into neutral territory it was found best not to report to border guards. In fact, if at all possible, soldiers were instructed to proceed to the American military attache in that particular country. As soon as any evader or escaper entered neutral jurisdiction, he automatically came under the command of the American military attache in that country.

The officials of neutral powers had no authority to demand from an escaper or evader any information other than name, rank, and serial number. During the early part of the war, many of our men mistakenly aided the enemy by answering all questions asked them by neutral or supposedly neutral officials. Even after repeated warnings and numerous briefings, some men continued to answer military questions although they were not required by law to do so.

An escaper who successfully entered a neutral country was not liable for punishment by the Germans if he was again recaptured. Under international law the rule had been interpreted that if an escaper succeeded in removing himself from enemy control, he had in fact escaped successfully. If, however, he was recaptured at any time before reaching neutral territory or his own lines, he could be punished for an unsuccessful escape. If he was recaptured after he had rejoined his own forces, he could not be punished for his successful escape.

Escapers and evaders who maintained successfully that they were escapers, who entered Switzerland during the early part of the war, were held until Allied forces reached that part of France contiguous to Switzerland. At that time they were repatriated. In Spain men who successfully reached the American military attache were evacuated to England by air. The same was true of Sweden, although activity here was cloaked in secrecy due to the close proximity of Sweden to Germany.

In Switzerland Allied personnel were confined in camps provided by the Swiss government. Pay and allowances for American soldiers came from the American military attache, as did all orders and regulations. Life in the detention camps was not particularly comfortable. Many men desired to attend Swiss universities but were not permitted to do so by the American military attache. In order to remove themselves from the life of an internee, some men chose to escape from Switzerland and attempt to make their way back through the lines to Allied control.

The rights and responsibilities of prisoners of war in enemy camps were fairly well defined during the late war. According to the Geneva Convention of 1929, to which Germany and the United States were signatory, any soldier captured was required to give only his name, rank, and serial number. All equipment which belonged to the government was liable to confiscation, but none of the personal property of the individual could be taken from him under the rules of war. If money or other valuables were taken, the individual was supposed to receive a receipt for them and to have them returned when he was liberated. Food was to be provided equal to the food given German soldiers stationed at the base camp.

Each prison camp was supposed to have the text of the Geneva Convention of 1929 posted in a conspicuous spot so that all prisoners could have access to it. If the rules were not posted, any prisoner had the right to ask that the text of the Convention, in English, be given him to read. If he felt that the detaining power was not complying with the rules, he could protest through the senior Allied officer to the Camp Commandant. Or, the senior Allied officer could register a protest with the neutral protecting power (Switzerland), who would take up the matter with the Camp Commandant.

In general, prisoners were entitled to the same treatment accorded soldiers in the enemy's army. They were entitled to the same food, same clothing, same medical care, and same punishment if they violated orders.

Officers were not required to work except when they volunte for some detail. Non-commissioned officers were not required to do manual labor. They could be used in a supervisory capacity, howeve Privates and PFC's could be used for work details. None of the work performed, however, was to be directly connected with the war effort. In other words, they could not be used to make munitions, haul munitions, prepare fortifications, or do any work that seemed directly connected with the war effort.

Officers and enlisted men were paid monthly wages in accordance with a prearranged schedule. The only exception to this was that no one could receive a higher rate of pay than men of their corresponding rank in the detaining country's army. Officers received approximately $24.00 per month. Non-commissioned officers who supervised unskilled work received about six cents a day; those who supervised skilled work received approximately thirty cents per day. Privates and PFC's received twelve cents per day for unskilled work and twenty-four cents per day for skilled labor.

Officers were required to salute all officers of the detaining power who were higher in rank than they were. Enlisted men were required to salute all officers of the detaining power.

In each prison camp there was a senior Allied officer to whom all new arrivals were to report. This officer assigned work details and in general handled the Allied administration of the camp. Only after reaching this officer could a new prisoner be assured that he was not talking to a stool pigeon. This officer represented the Allied government and his orders carried the same force of any American officer. In other words, American soldiers interned in any prison camp were still subject to the same rules and regulations of our army as they had been before capture.

Any armed escaper captured in civilian clothing was liable to be shot as a spy. Therefore, instructions were issued to all men flying over European territory to dispose of their personal weapons as soon as they took off their uniforms. There was a feeling on the part of some individuals that if they were captured in unifor and armed they would be executed as spies. There was no basis for this belief in the actions of the German Army or in international law. In the Balkans, an arm demanded respect. With this in mind, the Twelfth and Fifteenth Air Forces advised their personnel to retain their arms as long as possible.

The question of what constitutes a uniform was subject to definition by the capturing power. Under the Geneva Convention, the minimum requirement for an acceptable military uniform was two military buttons. No evidence is available which indicates whether or not the Germans accepted this definition.

There is evidence, however, which indicates that the Germans did not consider an evader or escaper a spy as long as he had his dog tags or some item for proving his identity. Airmen who were apprehended in civilian clothes and who had their dog tags were treated as evaders or escapers. In many instances the Germans threatened to treat the individual as a spy unless he would tell them all they wanted to know, but no evidence is available which indicates that the Germans shot such men as spies.

On the other hand, some men, when questioned by such tactics, asked to speak to the Camp Commandant to protest a violation of the Geneva Convention. Usually a strong protest of this sort resulte in the prisoner's being sent to a prison camp without further attempt at questioning.

The maximum penalty for attempting to escape under the Geneva Convention was thirty days confinement. During this period the individual was supposed to be allowed two hours of outdoor exercise and fresh air per day. In no case was the maximum penalty for a number of infractions to exceed thirty days confinement. No prisoner was to receive cruel or unusual punishments for any violation of rules or attempt at escape. Nor could any physical violence be inflicted upon the prisoner for any infraction of rules. If, however, he killed a civilian after escaping from camp, he was liable for trial under the criminal code of that particular country.

Officers and enlisted men were instructed never to give their parole unless for some specific length of time needed to accomplish a specific task. Men who needed hospital treatment were permitted to give their parole in order to receive necessary care. Both sides understood that it was the duty of a prisoner to escape. Therefore, under international law, escape was not considered a crime. Any officer or enlisted man who violated the provisions and instructions concerning paroles was liable to disciplinary action when he returned to American control.

Likewise, all our men were instructed never to broadcast from an enemy radio station. This was not a rule of international law but was promulgated by American authorities in order to keep the Germans from using such broadcasts for propaganda purposes. The English permitted their soldiers to broadcast as long as the broadcast was monitored by a representative from the Vatican.

IX

ORIENTALS AND ORIENTATION

The basic rules for successful evasion and escape in the Far East differed little from those used in Europe. An idea of the similarity between the two may be gained by noting the contents of an intelligence summary which outlined E&E procedures that should be followed in the Pacific.

EVASION TIPS

1. When parachuting into guerrilla territory evader should remove headgear before landing. Otherwise he may be shot by friendly troops as an enemy before mistaken identity is realized.

2. If your descent is observed by enemy forces they will make for your point of landing; therefore, get away from the spot and hide.

3. Orient yourself and formulate a plan of action.

4. Where there are friendly natives they will usually be able to lead to guerrilla aid.

5. Where help must be found it is better to approach one person at a time. Individuals may not know if their companions are trustworthy.

6. In case of doubt it is usually safer to approach people of the peasant class.

7. If a native names a rendezvous point do not wait at the exact spot. Hide nearby and observe it.

8. Follow advice of helpers once they have proven themselves. Never lie to them.

9. Good trade items are: cigarettes, parachute cloth, U.S. money (don't let it give you away). Don't give your all in first swap.

10. In most populated localities it is better to remain hidden during the day and travel at night.

11. Take care of your feet; don't kill yourself the first day.

The situation with regard to evasion was complicated by numerous factors, including (1) the great number of natives involved, (2) the great diversity of terrain and climatic conditions, and (3) the great distances involved. In many instances the chief problem was one of survival rather than evasion.[1]

Before bail-out or crash landing airmen were instructed to make every attempt to steer themselves away from Japanese controlled areas. In general the strongest Japanese garrisons were (1) in the larger towns, (2) around and along communications lines, particularly railroads, and (3) on the plains and flat lands. Thus, as in Europe, it behooved the evader to make for the hills. In them he could expect to find fewer Japs and more aid.

In China evaders relied primarily upon the Nationalists and Communists for aid. Although neither faction was friendly to the other, both would assist in the evacuation of airmen. To a certain extent the Nationalists and Communists were arranged against each other like the Partisans and Chetniks in Yugoslavia. Airmen, therefore, were instructed to ask that they be taken to an American mission or American air field. And, they were instructed not to talk politics.

---

[1] In this connection read 999 Survived: An Analysis of Survival Experiences in the Southwest Pacific, by Dr. Richard A. Howard. ADTIC Publication No. T-100, the Air University, February 1950. (Reprinted in July 1950.)

In areas held by Communists, evaders were instructed to seek out the younger men for contacts. Most of these would be either in the Communist Army or a part of the guerrilla forces and in either event would render aid. While in Chinese hands it was almost impossible for an evader to keep his presence a secret. Huge numbers of Chinese would gather to see what the American looked like and to pay homage to him and the country which he represented.

For this reason all our men were cautioned that they must do their best to create as good an impression as possible. Men were urged to keep clean and clean shaven. With Chinese morals being what they were, particularly in regard to women, it was advisable to lead a celibate life while a visitor. In the same vein, airmen were advised not to belittle the Chinese war effort, whether Nationalist or Communist, nor Chinese manners and customs. It was pointed out that the Chinese had an extremely old civilization of which they were very proud.

When it came time to move an evader the Chinese sometimes dispatched as many as 400 or 500 men to see that he passed through

Jap lines safely. The movement was made at night when there was less likelihood of military activity and when the darkness afforded protection from prying eyes.

During the rainy season it was often impossible to move for long periods of time. Airmen were told to expect this situation and not to be impatient at the delay. On such occasions villages often published the account of the parachutist's descent and his reaction to the Chinese. These newspapers came into Japanese hands but the Chinese made sure that the airman was untouchable before allowing the news to leak out.

One of the most valuable aids available to an evader was his "Pointie-Talkie." Without this it was difficult to get around until an English-speaking Chinese could be found. But with this aid an airman merely had to find some one who could read Chinese. Money provided in escape kits was virtually useless when in Chinese hands. In many instances the evaders were given money by the Chinese which was to be used for bribery of Japanese and puppet officials. Instead of currency the usual gesture was to make out a blood chit and give it to the men who had been most useful and instrumental in evacuating the airman.

One of the chief problems facing an airman, after finding refuge with the Chinese, was finding good drinking water and food. Most of the water in China was polluted and could be purified only by boiling several minutes or using halazone tablets. Since the Chinese used human waste for fertilizer, most of the food was open to suspicion, particularly leafy vegetables. The only means an airman could use to make sure that eatables were safe was to boil or cook everything. When there was a problem of offending a host by not taking proffered food, a nice diplomatic issue was raised.

In Burma and Indo China special teams were trained whose primary duty was to drop in and help evaders survive both the jungle and the Japs to return to duty. These men spoke one or more native dialects and were usually familiar with the area of operations into which they were dropped. Of course if the men were not located it meant that they would have to make their way to some native village and seek assistance.

In addition to these special teams there were teams from OSS in various parts of Burma that could and did render assistance As in Europe many evaders were guided on their way by these teams without realizing that any special operatives were within miles of them.

Most of the natives contacted by evaders were found to be friendly. Some would accept pay, others would not. Practically all of them accepted gifts and were anxious to get American tobacco.

To assist in rescue as soon as possible an SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) was worked out and disseminated to all personnel. If downed airmen were not located at the site of their crash or bail-out within a day or so, they were to proceed to the first river junction they could find. If nothing happened within two or three days, they then proceeded to make their way down stream until they came to the next junction, and so on until they received aid.

This system had the benefit of giving the evaders definite goals to aim for and kept them from getting battle fatigue wondering whether or not they would get out alive.